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Abstract
Researchers envisioned the Storage as a Service (StaaS) as an effective solution
to the distributed management of digital data, since it provides an inexpensive
and reliable online storage which is accessible by different types of computer
devices (e.g., mobile and desktop). However, the proliferation of cloud storage
services has fuelled concerns over privacy and security (e.g., dissemination
of malware and unauthorised access of private information). Together with
the growing of StaaS proposals, cloud storage is attracting the attention
of research, although cooperative storage cloud forensic is relatively under-
explored as this is a fairly new concept. Using Symform as a case study,
we seek to determine the data remnants from the use of cooperative cloud
storage services. In particular, we consider both mobile devices and personal
computers running various popular operating systems, namely Windows 8.1,
Mac OS X Mavericks 10.9.5, Ubuntu 14.04 LTS, iOS 7.1.2, and Android
KitKat 4.4. Potential artefacts recovered during the research include data
relating to the installation and uninstallation of the cloud applications, log-
in to and log-off from symform account using the client application, file
synchronisation (download, upload, and delete), as well as their timestamp
information. This research contributes to an in-depth understanding of
the types of terrestrial artefacts that are likely to remain after the use of
cooperative storage cloud on client devices.
Keywords: Cloud Forensics, Computer Forensics, Mobile Forensics,
Symform Analysis.
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1. Introduction
Cloud computing is, arguably, one of the most discussed computing
paradigms in recent years, due to its popularity among individual consumers
and organisations. Gartner [1] forecasted that the cloud computing market
will hit US$250 billion by 2017 as cloud adoption increases in organisations.5
International Data Corporation (IDC) [2] also published a similar forecast,
which indicated that the worth of the cloud computing market will exceed
US$107 billion and drive 17% of the IT product spending by 2017.
Despite the promising economical and technological opportunities, cloud
storage services are also being exploited by criminals, both traditional and10
cyber ones [3], in several ways such as information theft [4, 5, 6, 7] or
distributing copyright or illegal materials. Cloud servers have also been
exploited as an avenue for conducting denial of service attacks [8], cracking
passwords [9], and hiding criminal tracks [5].
Since the introduction of cloud computing, scholars have pointed out the15
challenges in conducting forensic investigations involving the use of cloud
storage services. These challenges mostly come from the lack of physical access
to digital artefacts over the servers spanning across multiple jurisdictional
areas, as well as integrity of data artefacts (e.g., log files) provided by the
Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. Even if the20
evidence could be identified, it could be illegal to access the raw log data that
contains records of multiple users in a multi-tenancy cloud environment [18].
The wide range of mobile devices [19] and the use of encryption by CSPs or
individuals [12] further complicate cloud forensic investigations.
To ensure timely and cost-effective responses to investigating cloud-related25
incidents, it is imperative that forensic examiners are cognisant about different
types of cloud products (or have access to such information), as well as the
potential artefacts detectable on each platform [20, 21, 22, 14, 23]. Depending
on the cloud storage solution in use, evidence (e.g., logs) of cloud usage could
be recovered from the client devices [21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28]. Hence, we30
seek to identify potential terrestrial artefacts that may remain after the use
of Symform cooperative storage cloud [29].
1.1. Background
A cooperative storage cloud is a fully decentralized storage model that
aggregates multiple cooperating nodes (e.g., game consoles, laptop, and35
personal computers) in the cloud environment [30]. By eliminating the need
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for storage servers, it offers a low cost, highly reliable, and secure cloud
storage system. Symform (Symbiotic Storage Platform) claims to be the first
cooperative storage cloud provider and reportedly has active users in 138
countries [31]. In 2014, Symform received the Best Cloud Storage Solution40
award in the 4th Annual Cloud Computing World Series [32]. The free service
allows users to store up to 10GB of storage. Users may acquire additional
space (up to 200GB) by donating a portion of unused space on their local
hard drive to Symform network for other users to store data. The users,
in return, receive 50% cloud storage space of the total hard drive space45
contributed. Alternatively, users are able to purchase additional space as low
as $10.00/month for 100GB storage [29].
To ensure secure storage of users’ data across its network of contributed
devices, Symform encrypts each sync/backup folder using 256-bit AES en-
cryption and breaks down each file into 64MB small data blocks. Then, the50
blocks are shredded further into sixty-four 1MB encrypted fragments before
geographically distributing those fragments in parallel across 96 different
nodes in the Symform network [33]. The index and encryption key of the
transmitted data reside on the file owner’s computer. When a file is uploaded,
Symform’s Cloud Control, the cloud management service hosted by Amazon55
Web Services (EC2), will constantly monitor all the peer devices containing
fragments of the file data blocks. In cases when a peer device is down or
at risk of failure, the system will automatically regenerate the fragments at
risk and distribute them to another contributing device in Symform network,
thereby increasing reliability and integrity of the data storage.60
Similar to other cloud storage services, Symform service can be accessed
using a web browser (but limited to the downloading, viewing and deleting the
files) or a client application available for devices running Microsoft Windows,
Apple Mac OS X, Linux, Apple iOS, Android, and Blackberry. Unlike
most cloud storage services, Symform allows users to selectively backup65
any folder across different devices. Symform users are required to install
the client application to setup and enable file synchronisation. The user
interface for the Linux and Mac (in alternative) client application is a web-
based Graphical User Interface (GUI) known as the Remote Device Manager
(RDM), which is accessible through ‘localhost:59234’ by default. The70
default Symform backup folders created by the OS are Music, Pictures,
Desktop, and Documents folders; which can be modified by the users. Notice
that Symform does not provide the ability for file sharing.
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1.2. Related work
Since the early 2010’s, a number of scholars have highlighted operational75
and legal challenges and various research opportunities associated with cloud
forensic investigations [34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 13, 10]. Recently, some re-
searchers published a number of technical solutions to mitigate the identified
challenges [40, 41, 42, 43, 23], particularly those associated with the re-
mote collection of data artefacts from a decentralised cloud infrastructure.80
Moreover, some other researchers also explored the potential of collecting
evidence from client devices [11, 21, 22, 24, 20, 44, 45, 25, 26, 27, 28, 17] and
servers [46, 47, 17]. Other research efforts include:
• Evaluation of the effectiveness of commercial forensic tools (e.g., Guid-
ance EnCase, the Forensics Tool Kit (FTK), Memoryze, and AWS Ex-85
port) in acquiring evidence remotely from the Amazon EC2 servers [48].
• Determining whether the integrity (e.g., any change in MD5, SHA1,
and timestamps) of the synced files acquired from popular cloud storage
providers, such as Dropbox, Google Drive, Microsoft SkyDrive [14] and
iCloud [45], are affected in the forensic collection.90
• Proposal of frameworks, guidelines and methodologies with the aims of
providing a systematic approach for forensic collection of cloud artefacts
from servers and/or client devices. Martini and Choo [46] were the
first to propose cloud forensic framework, which was used to investigate
ownCloud [47], Amazon EC2 [44], VMWare [23], and XtreemFS [49].95
Subsequently, Quick and Choo [21, 24] and Quick et al. [17] extended the
four-stage framework and validated using SkyDrive, Dropbox, Google
Drive and ownCloud [17]. Chung et al. [11] proposed a cloud inves-
tigation guideline and utilised it to investigate Amazon S3, Google
Docs, and Evernote on Windows, Mac OS, iOS, and Android devices.100
Farina et al. [25] investigated the artefacts left by Bit Torrent Sync
and outlined an investigative framework for the remote collection of
evidence from a decentralised file synchronisation network [50]. Scanlon
et al. [51] further extended the work of Farina et al. [25] and designed a
methodology for the network investigation of Bit Torrent Sync.105
Due to the recency of cooperative storage cloud services, this is the first
forensic research undertaken to identify artefacts of forensic interest that may
remain after the use of such services on the client’s device.
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1.3. Contribution
Similar to the approaches of Quick and Choo [21, 22, 24], we attempt to110
answer the following questions in this research:
1. Does the act of file download or file upload using Symform cooperative
storage cloud alter the file contents and timestamps of the original files?
2. What artefacts can be found on a computer hard drive and memory after
a user has used the Symform client application and web application?115
where are their locations on Windows 8.1, Ubuntu 14.04 LTS, and Mac
OS X Mavericks 10.9.5?
3. What data remains on an Apple iPhone 4 and an HTC One X after a
user has used the Symform client apps? where are their locations on
iOS Version 7.1.2, and Android KitKat 4.4?120
4. What data can be seen in network traffic?
Findings from this research will contribute to the forensic community’s
understanding of the types of terrestrial artefacts that are likely to remain
after the use of cooperative storage cloud on devices (e.g., personal computers
and mobile devices) running different operating systems.125
1.4. Outline
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the research
methodology. Section 3 details the evidence collection phase, which will
answer the first research question. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the findings
from the technical experiments involving the personal computers and mobile130
devices. These sections will answer the second and third research questions.
Section 6 explains the network artefacts, which will answer the final research
question of this research study. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude the paper
and outline potential future research areas.
2. Research Methodology135
This section provides an overview of the cloud investigation framework
used to guide the investigations in this paper as well as the experimental
setup.
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2.1. Cloud investigation framework
It is essential that (digital) forensic investigators or practitioners adhere140
to generally accepted forensic principles, standards, guidelines, procedures
and best practices when undertaking digital forensic investigations [52, 53].
In particular, Kent et al. [54] (p.5) define the forensic process as follows:
“An individual performing forensic activities needs to understand forensic145
principles and practices, and follow the correct procedures for each
activity, regardless of which group he or she is a member.”
As an example, Mckemmish [55] explained that digital forensic investi-
gations should be based on four principles, namely minimal of the original,150
account for any changes, comply with the rules of evidence, and not to
exceed knowledge. Moreover, the National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology (NIST) prescribed that a digital forensics framework should contain
the necessary components, namely collection, examination, analysis, and
reporting [54].155
In this research, we adopt the cloud investigative framework proposed by
Martini and Choo [46] as shown in Figure 1. While the framework shares
several similarities with the frameworks of McKemmish [55] and NIST [54],
it differs in a number of ways. The primary difference being that of the
third phase, which emphasises one or more simultaneous iteration(s) of160
the framework with evidence source identification and preservation via the
associated devices. These comprise remote servers, peer nodes (in P2P storage
cloud investigation), and other connected devices typically identifiable from a
client device.
In the following, we briefly explain each of the four investigation phases165
in the context of our research.
1. Evidence source identification and preservation. In the first phase, we
identify the physical hardware of interest, which contained the virtual
disk files (VMDK) and virtual memory files (VMEM) in each VM folder.
The mobile devices used in this research were an HTC One X running170
Android KitKat 4.4 and an Apple iPhone 4 running iOS Version 7.1.2.
We created and verified a forensic copy of each VMDK and VMEM file
in E01 container and raw image file (dd) formats respectively. For the
mobile devices, we acquired a bit-for-bit image of the internal storage
and we converted it to the E01 container format. Then, we calculated175
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an MD5 hash value for each original file and subsequently we verified
each copy.
Figure 1: Cloud forensics framework of Martini and Choo [46].
2. Collection. In this phase, we collected files containing the details needed
for analysis and keyword searching in the forensic copies. Similar to180
the earlier evidence source identification and preservation phase, we
calculated the MD5 and SHA1 hash values of each original file and
subsequently verified each collected or exported file. Further details of
this phase are explained in Section 3.
3. Analysis. This phase is concerned with the examination and analysis of185
data at rest, in motion, or in execution. We undertook data parsing,
carving, and keyword search for Symform artefacts located in the forensic
copies of volatile and non-volatile data captures. We considered both
indexed and non-indexed, as well as Unicode and non-Unicode string
searches (in Hex editor) as part of our keyword search. The following190
search terms were identified after examining the file names observed
and the text from within the Enron data files:
• symform.com, symform.
• 3111.zip, 3111.pdf, 3111.docx, 3111.jpg, 3111.rft, 3111.txt,
13100.zip, 13100.pdf, 13100.docx, 13100.jpg, 13100.rft,195
13100.txt, Enron, Pensive Parakeet.
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• the username and password created for this research.
4. Reporting and presentation. This phase involves legal presentation of
the collected evidential data in a court of law.
2.2. Experimental setup200
For our analysis, we created a total of 33 VMs each one representing
different physical systems to simulate a series of real life scenarios of using
Symform (e.g., install, access, upload, download, view, delete, and unin-
stall) on various operating systems, as detailed in tables 1, 2, 3, and 4,
and figures 2, 3, and 4. We used the base VMs as a control media to205
determine changes during each experiment. As explained by Quick and
Choo [21, 22, 24], using physical hardware to undertake setup, erasing, copy-
ing, and re-installing would have been an onerous exercise. Moreover, a
virtual machine allows room for error by enabling the test environment to
be reverted to a restore point if the results are unfavorable. We configured210
the hard drive and RAM with minimal space in order to reduce the time
required to analyse the considerable amounts of snapshots. Similar to the
approaches of Quick and Choo [21, 22, 14, 24], we used the 3111th and
13100th email messages of the UC Berkeley Enron email dataset (downloaded
from http://bailando.sims.berkeley.edu/enron_email.html on 24th of215
September 2014) to create the sample files and saved in .RTF, .TXT, .DOCX,
.JPG (print screen), .ZIP, and .PDF formats.
Immediately upon the completion of each experiment, we took a snapshot
of each of the VMs after being shutdown in order to allow restoring at a later
stage, if necessary. We remark that we captured the RAM immediately after220
each experiment, before the shutdown. As noted by Quick and Choo [21, 22],
.VMEM files represent a capture of memory dump which is not being with the
use of memory acquisition tools. Therefore, instead of acquiring RAM dump
using live acquisition tools, e.g., ‘win32dd’ and ‘FTK Imager’, we captured
the memory on a copy of the VMEM files created by VMware. A similar225
consideration was made in relation to creating a forensic copy of the hard
drive; we instantiated the physical hard drive by the copy of the VMDK files
created by VMware. Meanwhile, we facilitated the network traffic by the
.LIBPCAP files captured using ‘Wireshark’.
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Table 1: Configurations of virtual machines for Symform web application analysis on
Windows 8.1.
VM
(Parent and child VMs)
Details
1.0 Base-VM
1.1 IE, 1.2 MF, 1.3 GC
We prepared a base VM running Windows 8.1
Professional (Service Pack 1, 64-bit, build 9600),
and equipped with 2GB RAM and 20GB hard
disk. We then installed three well-known browsers
namely Microsoft Internet Explorer Version
11.0.9600.17351 (IE), Mozilla Firefox Version 33.1
(MF), and Google Chrome Version 37.0.2062.124m
(GC) into three separate VMs duplicated from the
base VM. We used a separate computer to create
Symform account, configure a Windows device,
and upload the sample files using the client
application.
Access-VM
1.1.1 IE, 1.2.1 MF,
1.3.1 GC
We created a copy of each web browser base
VM (1.0) and used to analyse the process of
logging in Symform web application using the
respective browsers on Windows 8.1.
Download/
Open-VM
1.1.2 IE, 1.2.2 MF,
1.3.2 GC
We created extra copies of the web browser base
VMs (1.0) to examine the process of downloading
and viewing files through each investigating web
browser on Windows 8.1. We noted the creation,
modification, and last accessed times of each file
to detect changes in timestamps following file
download.
Delete-VM
1.1.3 IE, 1.2.3 MF,
1.3.3 GC
We created additional copies of the web browser
base VM (1.0) to investigate the artefacts of
deleting synced files on the Symform web
application.
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Table 2: Configurations of virtual machines for Symform client application analysis on
Windows 8.1.
VM
(Parent and child VMs)
Details
1.4 Install-VM Using a duplicate copy of the base VM (1.0), we
accessed Symform website to download and
subsequently install the Symform client application
Version 4.24.0.0 (for Windows).
(http://www.symform.com/download/windows/)
1.4.1 Access-VM We made a copy of the install VM (1.4) to examine the
process of logging in Symform account using the client
application on Windows 8.1.
1.4.2 Upload-VM
(Synchronise)
We made a copy of the install VM (1.4). We copied the
Enron dataset files from the host machine to C:\sync
(self-defined backup folder) of this VM and
subsequently uploaded to the Symform server.
1.4.2.1 Uninstall-VM We created a copy of the upload VM (1.4.2) to examine
the process of uninstalling the Symform client
application on Windows 8.1. We performed
uninstallation using the default Windows uninstallation
feature (Control Panel\All Control Panel
Items\Programs and Features).
1.4.3 Download-VM
(Synchronise)
We duplicated the install VM (1.4) (without being
tainted with the dataset files) to examine the process of
downloading or synchronising files using the Symform
client application on Windows 8.1. We then
downloaded all the files which were uploaded from the
Upload-VM (1.4.2) to the C:\sync folder of this VM.
We noted the creation, modification, and last accessed
times of each file to detect changes in timestamps after
transferring files.
1.4.3.1 Delete-VM
(Synchronise)
We created a copy of the download VM (1.4.3) to
assess the process of deleting files downloaded or
synchronised using the Symform client application on
Windows 8.1 (without emptying the Recycle Bin). No
anti-forensic technique was applied to simulate a
typical file-deleting situation.
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Table 3: Configurations of virtual machines for Symform client application analysis on
Ubuntu 14.04 LTS.
VM
(Parent and child
VMs)
Details
2.0 Base-VM We prepared a base VM running Ubuntu 14.04 LTS, and
equipped with 1GB RAM and 20GB hard disk.
2.1 Install-VM We made a copy of the base VM (2.0) and used to access
Symform website
(http://www.symform.com/download/linux/) and
download and subsequently install the Symform client
application Version 4.24.0.0 (for Linux).
2.2 Access-VM We created a copy of the install VM (2.1) to examine the
process of logging in Symform account using the Symform
client application. Since Symform (Linux) client application is
a web GUI, we signed-in using the default Mozilla Firefox
browser (Version 31.0) by accessing
http://127.0.0.1:59234/.
2.3 Upload-VM
(Synchronise)
We used a duplicate copy of the install VM (2.1) to undertake
the file upload process on Ubuntu 14.04 LTS. We copied the
Enron dataset files from the host machine to /root/sync/
(self-defined backup folder) of this VM and subsequently
uploaded to the Symform server.
2.3.1
Uninstall-VM
Using a duplicate copy of the upload VM (2.3), we uninstalled
the Symform client application. We used the uninstallation
commands (e.g., sudo apt-get remove symform and sudo
apt-get purge symform).
2.4
Download-VM
(Synchronise)
We duplicated the install VM (2.1) (without being tainted
with the dataset files) to undertake the process of
downloading or synchronising files using the Symform client
application. We then downloaded all the files uploaded from
the Upload-VM (2.3) to /root/sync/ of this VM. We noted
the creation, modification, and last accessed times of each file
to detect changes in timestamps following file download.
2.4.1 Delete-VM
(Synchronise)
We created a copy of the download VM (2.4), without
emptying the Trash. We did not apply any anti-forensic
technique to simulate a typical file-deleting situation.
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Table 4: Configurations of virtual machines for Symform client application analysis on
Mac OS X Mavericks 10.9.5.
VM
(Parent and
child VMs)
Details
3.0 Base-VM We prepared a base VM running Mac OS X Mavericks 10.9.5, and
equipped it with 1GB RAM and 60GB hard disk.
3.1
Install-VM
Similar to Windows 8.1, we duplicated the base VM (3.0) and
used it to access Symform website
(http://www.symform.com/download/mac/) to download and
subsequently install the Symform client application
Version 4.24.0.0 (for Mac).
3.2
Access-VM
We created a copy of the install VM (3.1) to examine the process
of logging in Symform account using the client application and the
web GUI on Mac OS X Mavericks 10.9.5.
3.3
Upload-VM
(Synchronise)
We created a duplicate copy of the install VM (3.1) and used it to
undertake file upload through the Symform client application. We
copied the Enron dataset files from the host machine to
/Users/[User Profile]/sync/ (self-defined backup folder) of
this VM and subsequently uploaded it to the Symform server.
3.3.1
Uninstall-
VM
Using a duplicate copy of the upload VM (3.3), we uninstalled the
Symform client application by the uninstallation commands for
Mac OS (e.g.,
sudo/Library/Application\Support/Symform/scripts
/uninstall and
sudo/Library/Application\Support/Symform/scripts
/uninstall-purge).
3.4
Download-
VM
(Synchronise)
We duplicated the install VM (3.1) (without being tainted with
the dataset files) to examine the process of downloading or
synchronising files. In this VM, we downloaded all the uploaded
files from the upload VM (3.3) to /Users/[User Profile]/sync/
of this VM. We noted the creation, modification, and last accessed
times of each file to detect changes in the timestamps after
undertaking file download.
3.4.1
Delete-VM
(Synchronise)
We created a copy of the download VM (3.4) to assess the process
of deleting the files downloaded or synchronised (without emptying
the Trash). We did not apply any anti-forensic technique to
simulate a typical file-deleting situation.
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Figure 2: VMs created for Symform investigation on Windows 8.1.
Figure 3: VMs created for Symform investigation on Ubuntu 14.04 LTS.
In order to analyse the Symform mobile app, we prepared a default factory230
restored iPhone 4 running iOS 7.1.2 and an HTC One X running Android
KitKat 4.4 to simulate the use of the Symform app on both devices. To
gain root access to the devices, we jailbroke the iOS device using ‘Pangu8
Version 1.1’ and rooted the Android device using ‘Odin3 Version 185’. To
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examine the manner in which the file systems were treated with respect to235
the installation and viewing of files (the only feature supported by the mobile
apps) and the uninstallation of the Symform apps, we created a binary image
of the mobile devices for different Symform usage scenarios using ‘dd’ over
SSH/ADB Shell. In particular, we took the first image prior to the installation
of the Symform apps to ensure that neither Symform nor Enron-related data240
were on the devices. Then we installed the Symform iOS app Version 1.13
and Android app Version 1.3 on the respective devices and took the second
image of each device. Moreover, we took another image of the devices after
viewing the dataset files in the Symform apps. Then we made the final image
following the uninstallation of the apps.245
Figure 4: VMs created for Symform investigation on Mac OS X Mavericks 10.9.5.
‘Wireshark’ was hosted on the host machine to capture the network traffic
of the suspect’s VM; started prior each experiment was carried out, and we
saved a copy of the network capture after carrying out each experiment. To
ensure consistency of the findings, we conducted each experiment at least
thrice on different dates. Table 5 details the tools prepared to undertake this250
research.
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Table 5: Tools prepared.
Tool Usage
FTK Imager v3.2.0.0 To create forensic images for .VMDK and .VMEM files.
dd v1.3.4-1 To produce the bit-for-bit images of the internal
storage of the mobile devices.
emf decrypter.py To decrypt the iOS images acquired for analysis.
Autopsy 3.1.1 To parse the file system, produce directory listings,
and extracting or analysing images of the mobile
devices, stored files, browsing history, swap files,
unallocated partitions, as well as Windows system
files, e.g., NTUSER.dat registry files (using the
RegRipper plugin) and pagefile.sys Windows swap
files, located within the forensics images of .VMDK files.
HxD v1.7.7.0 To conduct keyword searches in .VMEM files.
Volatility 2.4 To analyse running processes (using the pslist
function), network information (using the netscan
function), and detecting the location of a string (using
the yarascan function) in physical memory dumps.
SQLite Browser v3.4.0 To view the contents of SQLite database files.
Wireshark v1.10.1 To analyse network files.
Network Miner v1.6.1 To analyse and carve network files.
Whois command To determine the registration information of an IP
address.
Photorec 7.0 To undertake data carving of memory files.
Nirsoft Web Browser
Passview v1.58
To recover the credential details stored within web
browsers.
Nirsoft cache viewer,
ChromeCacheView 1.56,
MozillaCacheView 1.62,
IECacheView 1.53
To parse and analyse web browsers’ cache files.
BrowsingHistoryView
v1.60
To parse and analyse web browsers’ history files.
Thumbcacheviewer
v1.0.2.7
To view the thumbnail images stored in Windows
thumbcache folder.
Windows Event Viewer
v1.0
To view Windows event files.
Console v10.10 (543) To view Mac-OS-specific log files (e.g., Apple System
Logs).
Windows File Analyser
2.6.0.0
To analyse Windows prefetch and link files.
Plist Explorer v1.0 To examine the contents of Apple Plist files.
chainbreaker.py To recover the master keys stored in Mac’s Keychain
dump.
NTFS Log Tracker To parse and analyse the $LogFile, $MFT, and
$UsnJrnl New Technology File System (NTFS) files.
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3. Collection and timestamp analysis
Before undertaking analysis into Symform, we collected data that would
potentially contain information of interest for cloud forensics (e.g., sync and
file management metadata, caches, cloud service and authentication data,255
encryption metadata, browser artefacts, mobile artefacts, as well as network
artefacts) as identified by Martini and Choo [46]. These included files stored
within unallocated partitions, swap files, log files (e.g., system logs stored
under %Windows% \system32\config on Windows machine, /var/log on
Ubuntu machine, /private/var/log on Mac OS machine, and Symform260
log files), thumbcache files, preference files (e.g., property list –Plist– files
stored within /Users/[User profile]/Library/Preferences/ of Mac OS),
Symform sync folders, web browser files, and Windows system files (e.g.,
$LogFile, $MFT, $UsnJrnl, NTUSER.dat, prefetch files, thumbcache files, link
files, as well as other installation and user-specific preference files saved under265
%ProgramFiles% \%AppData% \). The network traffic and RAM captures
were facilitated by the .LIBPCAP and .VMEM (preserved in AD1 format) files
captured in our research, respectively.
During our collection of the downloaded/synced files on Windows 8.1, we
observed that the last accessed and last modified times were the times when270
the files were downloaded. However, the last written times retained its original
value unchanged. On Ubuntu, we observed that the modification, creation,
and last opened times remained unchanged. On the other hand, the added
times were the times when the files were downloaded to the machine. An
inspection of the timestamps of the downloaded files on Mac OS determined275
that the modified times remained unchanged while the accessed times matched
the download times. Of all the OS investigated, the MD5 and SHA1 hash
values for the downloaded files remained the same as the original values in all
experiments, which suggested that no alteration was made during transmission
of the files.280
4. Symform analysis on computer devices
In this section, we present the findings of our analysis on Windows 8.1,
Ubuntu 14.04 LTS, and Mac OS X Mavericks 10.9.5. Symform artefacts
collected included data remnants within the directory listings, log files, browser
files, thumbnail cache, RAM, swap file/partition, unallocated space, as well285
as Windows system files (e.g., registry files, pagefile.sys, link files, and
prefetch files).
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4.1. Directory listings and files of forensic interest
The directory information is essential when seeking to determine if an
application has been used to initiate further investigation. An examination290
of the control base VMs (1.0 Windows Base-VM, 1.1 IE, 1.2 MF, 1.3 GC,
2.0 Ubuntu Base-VM, and 3.0 Mac Base-VM) confirmed that there was no
data related to Symform and the Enron emails on these VMs. Therefore,
any Symform-related data recovered from the remaining VMs would indicate
Symform usage.295
4.1.1. Windows 8.1
The main starting point of Symform investigation on Windows ma-
chine is in %Program Files% \Symform\. The folder of particular inter-
est is the %Program Files% \Symform\Node Service\logs folder, which
maintains a list of Symform log files useful to assist forensic practitioners300
in scoping the investigation (see Section 4.2). Meanwhile, the %Program
File% \Symform\Node Service\node.config XML file stores a wealth of
node-specific configuration details for the file synchronisation and contribu-
tion services, which include the server address for the cloud management
service (prefixed with ‘serverAddress’ ), unique SHA-1 node ID (prefixed with305
‘nodeId’ in the node tag), encrypted secret key (prefixed with ‘secretKey=’ in
the node tag) in base64 format, login username or email address (prefixed
with ‘username=’ in the userCredentials tag), encrypted password (prefixed
with ‘password=’ in the userCredentials tag) in base64 format, location of
the contribution folder (prefixed with ‘fragmentStorePath=’ in the contri-310
bution tag), port number of the contribution service (prefixed with ‘port=’
in the contribution tag), as well as bandwidth limits (prefixed with ‘upload-
BandwidthCapacity=’ and ‘downloadBandwidthCapacity=’ in the node tag
respectively).
Moreover, within the folderMapping tag we found an opening and closing315
folder sub-tag for the sync folder, which contain information such as the
folder global ID of a sync folder (prefixed with ‘remoteFolderGlobalId’ ), the
folder path (prefixed with ‘localPath=’), the remote folder name (prefixed
with ‘remoteFolderName=’), and the folder editing permission (prefixed with
‘direction=’) see Figure 5. Such information would be useful in identifying a320
user’s self-defined sync folder(s). The node and FolderGlobal IDs could also
assist investigators in correlating any external data obtained from an Internet
service provider (ISP) or other external content or service provider.
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Figure 5: Content of node.config File (valuable remnants are bolded).
In our experiments, we determined that when a sync folder was configured,
two hidden subfolders (.symform and .symform-store) would be created325
in the sync folder to store the synced file caches. The file of particular
interest is the metadata sqlite3 database in the .symform subfolder, which
maintains a list of synced file metadata such as synced filenames as well as
their sizes, last modified times, and checksums in the FolderItem Table. The
metadata remained in the database even after the synced files had been deleted,330
and the deleted files could be discerned from entries with empty Size and
Checksum table fields. Figure 6 shows an example of the FolderItem Table of
metadata database containing entries for deleted files namely Enron3111.zip,
Enron3111.txt, Enron3111.rtf, and Enron3111.pdf. The findings also
suggest that when a user uses Symform, there will be references to the335
creation or removal of the sync folder remaining in the NTFS files (e.g.,
$LogFile, $MFT, and $UsnJrnl) that can be used to identify its usage or
synced files; an example of the $LogFile entries is shown in Figure 7.
Located within the %SymformContribution% folder were subfolders storing
fragments of backup files from peer nodes. The file fragments were represented340
by the unique IDs with the following naming convention: [Unique SHA-1 for
a file fragment].[File fragment number].[Folder global ID] (e.g.,
0A1D16AF1E451120F32399828FEAEE3A8797XXXX.067.0000000220035142XX
XX). However, the shredded and encrypted file fragments mean the actual files
are not recoverable without the assistance from cloud service provider. In ad-345
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dition, the presence of Symform executable files in %AppData% \Local\Temp\
would suggest recent Symform usage.
Figure 6: The ‘FolderItem’ Table of metadata database.
Figure 7: $LogFile entries containing references to the creation of Symform sync folder.
The files downloaded through the web browsers were stored in
%Downloads% \ by default. We observed that each downloaded file was given350
an Alternate Data Stream (ADS) ZoneTransfer marker (ZoneID) with reading
‘ZoneID=3 ’, which indicates that the files were downloaded from Internet
zone [56]. The ADS ZoneID is useful to determine the origin of a synced file
especially in the absence of the Internet browsing history. The deleted files
along with the original extensions and ADS ZoneIDs (when downloaded using355
a browser) could be recovered from the non-emptied % $Recycle.Bin% \SID
folder, only if the forensic practitioner is aware that the filenames had been
renamed to $R and $I followed by a set of random characters. Information
relating to the original files, such as the original paths, sizes, and delete times,
could also be recovered from the $R and $I files.360
Undertaking uninstallation of the Symform client ap-
plication, we determined that %Program File% \Symform\,
%AppData% \Local\Temp\Symform\, and %SymformContribution% \
remained on the hard drive, but they were empty. However, we identified
that the .symform and .symform-store cache folders were not removed365
from the sync folder, which included the metadata database located within
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the .symform cache folder. These artefacts could be useful for ascertaining
the sync folder and recovery of the synced file history after uninstallation of
the client application, since a typical user would not manually delete the
cache folders (hidden by default). In addition, the uninstallation could be370
ascertained from the presence of entries referencing removal of the client
application filenames in the $LogFile, $MFT, and $UsnJrnl NTFS files.
4.1.2. Ubuntu 14.04 LTS
An examination of the directory listing of the Install-VM (2.1) re-
vealed that the main installation directory of the Linux Symform appli-375
cation could be located in /opt/symform/ by default. Of particular inter-
est is the /opt/symform/bin/logs subfolder which stores various Symform
logs (see Section 4.2.4). In addition, we located copies of the log files in
/var/log/symform/. A list of certificates used by Symform stored within the
/var/lib/symform/.mono/certs/Trust folder and the user keypair meta-380
data (e.g., the base64-encoded values of the P, Q, DP DQ, InverseQ, and
D keys of the RSA algorithm used by Symform) could be located in the
/var/lib/symform/.mono/keypairs folder.
The Symform contribution folder and node.config file (see Section 4.1)
could be located in /SymformContribution/ and /var/lib/symform/ re-385
spectively. Similar to the Symform client application for Windows, we
identified that when a sync folder is set up on Ubuntu OS, two hidden
cache folders (.symform and .symform-store) will be created to store the
sync file caches. The /home/[User Profile]/.local/share/Trash/files
trash folder, when not emptied, would enable the recovery of deleted synced390
files. Additionally, the original file path and deletion time of each deleted
file could be recovered from the .TRASHINFO file located in /home/[User
Profile]/.local/share/Trash/info/ – see Figure 8. When the uninstal-
lation occurred, we observed that the /opt/symform, /var/log/symform,
and /var/lib/symform folders were emptied. However, forensic practitioners395
could potentially recover the synced file history from the metadata database
remained in the .symform cache folder (of each sync folder).
4.1.3. Mac OS X Mavericks 10.9.5
The main installation directory of the Symform client application
for Mac OS is in /Library/Application Support/Symform/. The400
/Library/Application Support/Symform/bin/logs/ directory maintains
a list of Symform logs. This would enable forensic practitioners to obtain
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relevant Symform usage information (see Section 4.2.4). Alternatively, a
copy of the logs folder could be located in /private/var/logs/Symform/.
The node.config file, Trust folder (which contains a list of certificates405
used by Symform), and keypairs folder (that contains the user key-
pair information as outlined in Section 4.1.2) could also be located in
/private/var/lib/symform/.
Figure 8: Trash info for deleted files in Linux.
When the file synchronisation occurred, we were able to recover
copies of the node.config file from the receiver data table field of410
the cfurl cache receiver data table of Cache.db database located in
/Users/[User Profile]/Library/Caches/com.symform.mac.Symform.
Also located in the same table field were additional details relating to the
file synchronisation sessions such as number of syncing folders, number
and sizes of syncing files, file transfer speeds, remote folder names, local415
folder names, the estimated sync durations, and the service start times.
In addition, the cfurl cache response table of Cache.db maintains
a list of Symform URLs as well as the corresponding timestamps (see
Figure 9). Forensic practitioners could potentially discern the start and stop
timestamps for the sync service from the timestamps of the request key420
entries referencing http://localhost:[Portnumber]/syncService/start
and http://localhost:[Portnumber]/syncService/stop respectively.
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Alternatively, references to the download links for the installer and
synced files could be potentially recovered from the /Users/[User
Profile]/Library/Preference/com.apple.LaunchServices.Quarantine425
EventsV2 sqlite3 database.
Figure 9: The cfurl cache response Table of Cache.db.
Similar to the Windows and Linux investigations, setting up of a Symform
sync folder in Mac OS observed that two hidden cache folders (.symform
and .symform-store) will be present. The deleted files were located in the430
non-emptied /Users/[User profile]/.Trash folder. Although the unin-
stallation would empty the /Library/ApplicationSupport/symform and
/SymformContribution folders, the synced file history could be potentially
recovered from the metadata Database remained in the .symform cache folder
(of each sync folder).435
4.2. Log files
Logs play a vital role in an incident investigation [57]. The log analysis in
this research included searching for the term Symform and the Enron dataset
filenames as well as going through the entries identifying events relevant
to Symform.440
4.2.1. Windows 8.1
Similar to any other Windows application, when the Symform client
application was installed or uninstalled on Windows 8.1, we located event
entries referencing the installation or uninstallation of the services as well as
the associated timestamps in Windows event files such as Application.evtx445
and System.evtx (see Figure 10) saved in %Windows% \system32\config\.
When file synchronisation took place via the client application, there were
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entries referencing symformsync in the aforementioned Windows event files
(see Figure 11).
450
Figure 10: Windows event log entry for Symform installation.
4.2.2. Ubuntu 14.04 LTS
Log files are particularly important in Linux investigations as almost all
processes, events, and user account activities are logged [58]. When the Sym-
form installation occurred on a Linux machine, forensic practitioners could
potentially recover events relating to the creation of Symform services from455
the /var/log/syslog. Further information about the installation could be
located in the /var/log/dpkg.log, since the log file maintains a list of events
relating to the Symform.deb installer package such as the Symform version
installed, installation status (e.g., unpacked, configured, and installed) as well
as the corresponding installation time. Moreover, the /var/log/auth.log460
would provide information associated with the authorisation (granting supe-
ruser permission) details for Symform installation sessions, the paths accessed
during the installation, and the corresponding installation time. The term
Symform could be used in future searches.
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Figure 11: Windows event log entry for Symform sync service.
4.2.3. Mac OS X Mavericks 10.9.5465
The installation or use of the Symform client application on a Mac ma-
chine could be discerned from the presence of Kernel and system events (e.g.,
program errors, installation data, privilege escalation) for the Symform main
services in the /private/var/log/system.log log file, which contains infor-
mation of interest such as the Symform application name, PID, and path ref-470
erences for the main services. Similar information could be found in the Apple
System Logs (ASL) located at /private/var/log/asl/YYYY.MM.DD.[User
identification].[Group identification].asl (where user identification
(UID) and group identification (GID) are optional). Further information of
the installation could be located in /private/var/log/install.log, which475
contains entries relating to the installation of the client application such as
filename of the installer, the Symform version installed, as well as the time of
installation. The term Symform could be used in future searches.
4.2.4. Symform logs
We determined that Symform logs were stored in %Program480
Files% \Symform\Node Service\logs\ on Windows machine,
/var/log/symform/ on Ubuntu machine, and /var/log/symform/ on
Mac OS machine unencrypted. We also determined that by default, the
logs would be archived hourly in compressed .GZ format and kept for a
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month before being deleted, with the exception of the setup logs (e.g.,485
symformsetup.log, symformupdater.log, and loguploader.log). As the
filename suggests, the symformsetup.log maintains a list of the client
application setup information such as the version of the Symform client
application installed, email addresses used to login the client application,
login URLs, the full path(s) of the sync folder(s), as well as the installation490
time, which could be a potential starting point for Symform investigation.
The symformsync.log, symformsync-mono.log, symformcontrib.log,
and symformcontrib-mono.log store a wealth of events relating to the Sym-
form client application usage, comprising references to the node.config file
path, copies of the node.config file, types of cryptographic algorithms used495
(e.g., MD5CryptoServiceProvider, SHA1CryptoServiceProvider, SHA256Cng,
and AesCryptoServiceProvider), as well as the network details (e.g., download
and upload speeds and its bandwidth limits). In addition, the filename and
path references for the downloaded or uploaded files, request IDs for the
backup file fragments, file synchronisation statuses, port numbers used by500
the file synchronisation services, as well as the times when the file synchro-
nisation services were started and terminated could be recovered from the
symformsync.log and symformsync-mono.log (see Figure 12). The terms
download, downloading, starting download session, upload, uploading, starting
upload session, syncing, and preparing could be used to locate the synced file505
details. Meanwhile, the node configuration information could be discerned
from log entries referencing the term SyncHost, while the external IP ad-
dresses used by the host could be located using the term LastSeenIPAddress.
Within the symformcontrib.log and symformcontrib-mono.log there ex-
ists additional information relating to the contribution service such as the510
full path of the contribution folder, the port number for the contribution
service, the times when the contribution service was started or terminated, as
well as the external IP addresses of the corresponding nodes. The timestamp
information noted along the log entries could be used for timeline or super
timeline analysis [59].515
When we accessed Symform on Ubuntu, we located references to the di-
rectories accessed and created by the Symform client application in the
/var/lib/dpkg/info/symform.list log file, which is useful when seek-
ing to determine the installation and sync folder paths. In addition, the
symformcloudcache.log (found only in Mac OS) maintains a list of HTTP520
requests for retrieving or updating the account or client-device information
from or to the server along with the associated timestamps (see Figure 13).
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Figure 12: An excerpt of symformsync.log recovered from our research.
Figure 13: An excerpt of symformcloudcache.log.
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4.3. Thumbnail cache
Thumbnail cache is a potential alternative source for recovery of images525
relevant to an investigation [60]. Analysis of the Thumbcache files stored under
%AppData% \Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\ of the Install-VM (1.4)
and Access-VM (1.4.1, 1.1.1 IE, 1.2.1 MF, and 1.3.1 GC) located copies of
thumbnail images for the client or web application such as Symform logo and
image icons appeared on the GUI. When the sample files were synced, we530
located copies of the thumbnail images in the Windows Thumbcache files.
However, no thumbnail relevant to Symform was located in the Ubuntu and
Mac OS VMs.
4.4. Web browser artefacts
Web browsing information is another potential source of information in535
cloud investigations [21, 22, 24, 46]. In this section, we present the artefacts
of the Symform web application and RDM recovered in our experiments.
4.4.1. Symform web application
Symform only allows users to download or delete files through its web
application interface. Whilst accessing the web application, we observed that540
the username could be located at the top right corner of the browser. The
web application retains a record of devices/nodes linked with an account
in the left-hand pane of the browser. When we select a device, the web
application will display the backup folders/files associated with the device.
When hovered over an inactive device (marked with X ), a message “Device545
has not been reported in XX days” will be displayed. The web application
also has an option to show or restore deleted files (within 7 days of deletion).
Unlike Dropbox and Google Drive investigated by Quick and Choo [21, 22],
other than the duration (in days) from the last modified date, Symform web
application does not show timestamp information such as last accessed time,550
file creation time, and last written time of the backup files.
Similar to any other web application, accessing Symform through
a web browser would leave URLs referencing www.symform.com along-
side the associated timestamp information and view counts in the
browsing history. When we logged in Symform, we observed the URL555
control.symform.com in the web browsing history, as well as the
download link content.symform.com/api/v0/folder/[Folder global
ID]/[Filename] when we performed file download. When we accessed
Symform using Google Chrome, we located the aforementioned URLs
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in the thumbnails Table of the %AppData% \Local\Google\Chrome\User560
Data\Default\Top Sites database, indicative of frequent Symform
usage. Moreover, the presence of the URLs aforementioned in
the %AppData% \Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Current
Tabs and %AppData% \Local\Google\Chrome\User
Data\Default\Last Session files of Google Chrome,565
%AppData% \Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\%PROFILE%.default\
sessionstore.js of Mozilla Firefox, as well as
%AppData%\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WebCache\V01.log and
%AppData%\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WebCache\WebCacheV01.dat of
Internet Explorer would suggest recent Symform usage.570
Within the web caches of all the investigating web browsers, we located
the intact copies of downloaded files (Figure 14) as well as Symform images,
HTML, Cascading Style Sheets (CSS), and Javascripts referencing Symform
used by the web application, which included the last access timestamp infor-
mation for the cache files. Additionally, when we closed the Mozilla Firefox575
tab for Symform, we could locate thumbnail images for Symform page in
%AppData%\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\%PROFILE%.default\
thumbnails\.
Figure 14: A copy Symform downloaded sample file recovered from Google Chrome browsing
cache.
We could recover the login credentials (if saved) easily us-580
ing tools like Nirsoft Web Browser Passview [61]. We deter-
mined that in Google Chrome, the credential details (login email
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and encrypted password) are stored in the Login Data and Web
Data files located under %AppData% \Local\Google\Chrome\User
Data\Default\. Meanwhile, the credential details can be located585
in the formhistory.sqlite database and logins.json file under
%Users% \user\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\ when
saved in Mozilla Firefox. The login credentials recovered could facilitate user
profiling and the accessing of the relevant accounts or applications.
4.4.2. Remote Device Manager590
In this research, we accessed the RDM using Mozilla Firefox v3.10
(the default Ubuntu web browser) on Ubuntu and the inbuilt Ap-
ple Safari browser (Version 7.0.6 (9537.78.2)) on the Mac OS ma-
chine. When we set up the client application using the RDM on
Ubuntu, we recovered URLs making reference to 127.0.0.1:59234/tour,595
127.0.0.1:59234/setup, and 127.0.0.1:59234/setup/done in the
browsing history and sessionstore.js file located in /home/[User
profile]/.mozilla/firefox/[Random ID].default/, which comprised
the associated timestamp information and view counts (in the for-
mer). When the sign-in occurred, we located URLs referencing600
127.0.0.1:59234/login and 127.0.0.1:59234/general in the Ubuntu
Mozilla Firefox files aforementioned as well as /Users/[User Profile
/Library/Caches/Metadata/Safari/History.plist Safari history file
(when accessed on Mac OS). Additionally, we located a thumbnail image
(screenshot) of the RDMwebpage which appeared on the new tab page of Safari605
in /Users/[User Profile/Library/Caches/com.apple.Safari/Webpage
Previews/. This is indicative of Symform usage.
4.5. Memory analysis
Memory forensics allow one to recover volatile information which would
otherwise be lost [62]. In this research, we undertook data carving using610
Photorec, keyword search using Hex Workshop, and contextualising the RAM
contents using Volatility.
When we analysed the running processes using the pslist, linux pslist,
and mac pslist functions of Volatility, we recovered several process
instances for Symform services, which included the process names615
(e.g., symformstatus.exe, symformupdater.exe, symformcontrib.exe,
and symformsync.exe on Windows 8.1; symformstatus, symformupdater,
symformcontrib, and symformsync on Ubuntu; symform on Mac), process
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identifiers (PIDs), parent process identifiers (PPIDs), and the process ini-
tiation times; Figure 15 shows an example of the Windows processes. Our620
analysis also showed that the Symform processes are amalgamated into a
single process, namely Symform on the Mac OS machine (in comparison with
the process names presented for the Windows and Linux client applications).
The PIDs could assist the investigator in obtaining data associated with the
Symform client application during further analysis of the RAM (i.e., mapping625
a string of relevance to the instances resided in the memory space of the PID
using the yarascan Function of Volatility). Analysing the network details
using the netscan, netstat linux, and netstat mac functions of Volatility,
we observed that the local, foreign, and peer node IP addresses could be
recovered, which included its port numbers, socket states, PIDs, and process630
names. Such information is particularly useful for timeline analysis as well as
in requests for assistance from counterparts overseas (e.g., via Interpol).
Figure 15: An excerpt of Symform processes recovered using the pslist Function of Volatility.
When we accessed Symform using the client applications, we were able
to carve the image icons used by the client applications as well as files of635
forensic interest, such as symformsync.log, node.config, and the metadata
database from the RAM captures. We could also recover the thumbnail
images, script files, HTML documents, cache files, and other web browser
files used by the web application after accessing the Symform web application.
In all the investigated VMs, we could recover sample files from the RAM640
captures intact.
Manual analysis of the RAM captures of the client applications’ file
synchronisation VMs (1.4.2, 1.4.3, 2.3, 2.4, 3.3, and 3.4) revealed copies of
the files of forensic interest in the memory space of symformsync.exe on
Windows machine, symformsync on Ubuntu machine, and symform on Mac645
OS machine in plain text; Figure 16 and Figure 17 show examples of the
remnants of the node.config and metadata database, respectively. This could
prove useful to forensic practitioners when seeking to determine the origin of
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the texts in the absence of the original files. Our findings suggested that
there are more than one way to recover the filename and path references650
for synced files from the symformsync.log in the RAM, for example, by
searching for the terms uploading and downloading. Moreover, the terms
‘userName=’ and creationversion could be used to locate remnants of the
node.config and metadata database respectively during future searches.
When we used a browser to download the synced files, we were able to recover655
copies of the download links from the RAM (see Figure 18) by searching for
content.symform.com.
Figure 16: Remnants of node.config located within the memory space of symformsync.exe.
Figure 17: Remnants of metadata database located within the memory space of
symformsync.
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Figure 18: A file download link recovered from the RAM of Mozilla Firefox VM.
A search for Enron-related keywords (e.g., Enron and Pensive Parakeet)
in the RAM of all the file synchronisation VMs (1.1.2 IE, 1.2.2 MF, 1.3.2 GC,660
1.4.2, 1.4.3, 2.3, 2.4, 3.3, and 3.4) resulted in the recovery of the complete
text of the sample files. Although the login credentials were encrypted,
when we used the web browsers to access the Symform web application, the
username and password were found prefixed with the terms session.emails
and session.password respectively in the RAM captures; Figure 19 depicts665
an example. The login email and password for the RDM could be recovered
from the RAM of the Ubuntu’s access and file synchronisation VMs (2.2, 2.3,
and 2.4) in plaintext (see Figure 20) by searching for the terms ‘“email”:’
and ‘“password”:’. When the credentials were saved in the Keychain (the
password manager of Mac OS), we were able to recover the master key by670
using the keychaindump Function of Volatility. The master key recovered was
then used to decrypt the credential details using chainbreaker.py script, as
shown in Figure 21.
Figure 19: Symform login credentials recovered from the RAM of Google Chrome VM.
Undertaking file deletion using the web application resulted in the
recovery of the deletion message “Are you sure you want to delete675
[Filename] from your account? Files will be saved for up to 7
days for recovery?”. The file deletion could also be discerned from
the presence of the link https://control.symform.com/api/v0/folder/
[FolderglobalID]/file/[Filename] prefixed with the term delete in the
RAM of Mac OS. We remark that the findings are dependent on the RAM680
size and user activities undertaken prior to the forensic examination.
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Figure 20: Symform login credentials recovered from RAM.
Figure 21: An excerpt of chainbreaker.py output.
When we searched for the term Symform in the swap files (also known as
pagefile.sys on Windows [63]) of all the file synchronisation VMs (1.1.2 IE,
1.2.2 MF, 1.3.2 GC, 1.4.2,1.4.3, 2.3, 2.4, 3.3, and 3.4), we could only recover
filename/path references for the synced files and client application files (when685
accessed using the client applications). Although the findings from swap files
were not as conclusive as those presented for the RAM analyses, the presence
of the filename/path references in the swap files could prove useful to indicate
recent Symform usage.
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4.6. Unallocated space690
Unallocated space is a potential source of information in an investigation,
such as intact files as well as filename and path references that were created
and deleted by the user or the system [21, 22]. Similar to the RAM analysis,
in our examination of the unallocated client applications’ file synchronisation
VMs (1.4.2, 1.4.3, 2.3, 2.4, 3.3, and 3.4), we identified that the files of forensic695
interest such as symformsync.log, node.config, synced files, as well as
the metadata database could be recovered from the unallocated spaces intact.
Moreover, we were able to recover copies of the image icons and files of
relevance (e.g., script files, HTML documents) used by the client application,
RDM, and web application from the unallocated spaces; indicative of Symform700
usage. The presence of the data remnants aforementioned in the Delete-VM
(1.4.3.1, 2.3.1, 3.3.1) and Uninstall-VM (1.4.2.1, 2.4.1, 3.4.1) reinforced that
unallocated partition is an important source for recovering deleted Symform
or synced files.
4.7. Windows system files705
In this section, we present the Symform artefacts located within the
registry, prefetch and link files of Windows 8.1.
4.7.1. Registry files
Windows registry provides a rich source of information associated with
installed programs [64]. Although five hives could be seen in the registry, only710
HKEY USERS (HKU) and HKEY LOCAL MACHINE (HKLM) hives are
tangibly real, since the remaining are merely symbolic links to the two master
keys [65]. An analysis of the registry of the Install-VM (1.4) revealed that the
installation of the Symform client application would result in the addition
of approximately 82 registry keys. We could detect the installation from the715
presence of entries referencing Symform executable files, the Symform version
installed, the installation paths, Symform URLs, the date it was installed, or
other options in the following registry keys:
• HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Installer\
UserData\S-1-5-18\Products\[Product GUID]\InstallProperties720
• HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\
{[Product GUID]}
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In addition to the aforementioned registry keys, we located descriptions and
full path references for Symform services (e.g., symformsync, symformupdater,
and symformcontrib) in the following registry subkeys:725
• HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\[Symform service name]
• HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\[Symform service
name]
While using the Symform client application, we observed that six sub-
branches for Symform setup, contribution, and status services were created730
in the Windows Routing and Remote Access service (RRAS) registry keys
listed below. According to [66], the keys are used to enable file tracing for
diagnosing network problems (relating to the Symform client application in
this case). The keys remained in the registry even after the Symform client
application was uninstalled.735
• HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Tracing\Symformcontrib RASAPI32
• HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Tracing\Symformcontrib RASMANICS
• HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Tracing\Symformsetup RASAPI32
• HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Tracing\Symformsetup RASMANICS
• HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Tracing\Symformstatus RASAPI32740
• HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Tracing\Symformcontrib RASMANICS
Each time an application is started, Windows automatically extracts the
application name from the version resource of the executable file and stores
it in the MuiCache registry key for later use [67]. When the Symform client
application was started up, we located entries referencing Symform executable745
files in the following MuiCache keys:
• HKU\< SID > Classes\Local Settings\MuiCache
• HKU\S-1-5-21\Software\Classes\Local Settings\MuiCache
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Similar to any other Windows application, when we configured Symform
to run automatically whenever Windows starts, we located entries referencing750
Symform under Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
registry key (Figure 22 depicts an example). Other evidence indi-
cating the use of the Symform client application include the pres-
ence of entries referencing %Desktop% \SymformNodeNew.exe (1) as
well as the time when the client application was last executed in755
Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UserAssist
(which holds information about the .EXE files and links that a user opens
frequently [68]).
Figure 22: Symform entry located under Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.
The TypedURLs key contains a listing of 25 recent URLs (or file760
path) typed in the Internet Explorer or Windows Explorer address
bar [69]. When we used Internet Explorer to access Symform ac-
count, we could locate references to Symform URLs and the accessed
times under Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\TypedURLs and
Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\TypedURLsTime registry keys re-765
spectively, Figure 23 shows an example. It is to the best of the authors’
knowledge that none of the remaining browsers utilise the registry in the way
that Internet Explorer does.
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Figure 23: Symform URLs located under Software\Microsoft\Internet
Explorer\TypedURLs and \Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\TypedURLsTime.
Another registry key of forensic interest is the
Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ComDlg32.770
According to [70], the CIDSizeMRU (MRU is the abbreviation for Most-
Recently-Used) subkey maintains a list of recently used applications, the
OpenSaveMRU registry subkey records list of files that have been opened or
saved within a Windows shell dialog box, and the LastVisitedMRU subkey is
responsible for tracking specific executable files used by an application to open775
the files documented in the LastVisitedMRU subkey. When we downloaded
the sample files, we identified that there were various entries making reference
to Symform or the browser’s executable file (when downloaded using a
browser) in the aforementioned registry subkeys, which included filenames for
the downloaded files and references to the last accessed times (see Figure 24).780
The RecentDocs key corresponds to %Recent%\ (My Recent Documents),
which maintains a list of local or network files recently executed or opened
through Windows Explorer [71]. Undertaking a download of the sample
files resulted in the creation of entries making reference to filenames and
file extensions for the downloaded files as well as the last written times785
in Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RecentDocs
(see Figure 25). We were also able to locate entries referencing the HTML
document of the Symform web application (namely Symform Web App.htm)
in the RecentDocs key after we had accessed the Symform account using a
browser.790
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Figure 24: File download information located in
Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ComDlg32.
4.7.2. Prefetch files
A prefetch file contains information about a loaded application on Windows
(e.g., executable filename, path, associated dlls, number of times an applica-
tion has been loaded, last run time, and other associated timestamps). An
examination of the prefetch files in %SystemRoot% \Prefetch of the Install-795
VM (1.4) identified that the installation would result in the creation of Sym-
form prefetch files such as SYMFORMSETUP.EXE.pf, SYMFORMNODENEW.EXE.pf,
and SYMFORMUPDATER.EXE.pf. When we performed file synchronisation, we
could observe the prefetch files namely SYMFORMCONTRIB.EXE.pf (for the con-
tribution service), SYMFORMSTATUS.EXE.pf, and SYMFORMSYNC.EXE.pf in the800
file synchronisation VMs (1.4.2 and 1.4.3). However, we could not locate any
prefetch entry relating to the synced files. We determined that the Symform
prefetch files remained in the hard drive even after uninstalling the client
application.
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Figure 25: Recently opened documents located in
Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RecentDocs.
4.7.3. Link files805
Link (.lnk) files are shortcut metadata files used by Windows to maintain
a list of linked paths relating to a file (commonly the paths where the
original files are located), associated timestamps (create, write, and last
accessed times), and file sizes (original and modified), which could be used
to identify the origin of a file [72]. Analysing the link files of the client810
application’s file synchronisation VMs (1.4.2 and 1.4.3), we located two link
files namely Symform Setting.lnk and Symform Status.lnk for %Program
Files% \Symform\Node Service\symformsetup.exe and %Program
Files% \Symform\Node Service\symformstatus.exe, respectively in
%ProgramData% \Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Symform\.815
Of all the VMs investigated, we were only able to locate link files for the
sample files under %AppData% \Roaming \Microsoft\Windows\Recent\ of
the Mozilla Firefox Download-VM (1.2.2).
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5. Symform analysis on mobile devices
In this section, we present the findings of our analysis on iPhone 4 running820
iOS 7.1.2 and an HTC One X running Android KitKat 4.4.
5.1. Symform analysis on iOS 7.1.2
Examination of the directory listing identified that the Symform
iOS app installation could be discerned from the presence of the
/private/var/mobile/Applications/[Unique SHA-1 identifier825
for the Symform iOS app]/Symform.app application folder. The
/private/var/mobile/Applications/[Unique SHA-1 identifier for
the Symform iOS app]/iTunesMetadata.plist maintains a list of mobile-
specific metadata associated with the Symform app such as the Apple ID
used to purchase the app, the purchase date, the Symform version installed830
and other information, as detailed in Figure 26.
The Cache.db (see Section 4.1.3) for the Symform iOS app could be located
in /private/var/mobile/Applications/[Unique SHA-1 identifier for
the Symform iOS app]/Library/Caches/com.symform.ios.Symform/.
When we viewed the sample files, we located copies of the files in835
/private/var/mobile/Applications/[Unique SHA-1 identifier for
the Symform iOS app]/private/var/mobile/Applications/[Unique
SHA-1 identifier]/tmp/downloads/ intact, which included the file formats
and viewing timestamps.
Whilst viewing the synced files in the app, we observed that Symform840
iOS application (Version 1.13) offers an option to upload logs. When
this option is enabled, a copy of the symformcloudcachelogs.log
(see Section 4.2.3) will be emailed to the account owner. In ad-
dition, we could detect the trace of Symform usage from the
/private/var/log/DiagnosticMessages/YYYY.MM.DD.asl log of iOS.845
Other than the Kernel and system events (similar to those discussed
in Section 4.2.3), we could recover the file download URLs as well as
the timestamp information from the ASL logs (see Figure 27). Neither
Symform-related folder nor files remained after the uninstallation of the
Symform iOS app.850
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Figure 26: Content of iTunesMetadata.plist.
Figure 27: An example of ASL log containing file download information of the Symform
iOS app.
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5.2. Symform analysis on Android KitKat 4.4
The installation of the Symform Android app resulted in
the creation of /data/data/com.symform.android.symform folder
which has five subfolders, namely app webview, cache, files,855
lib, and shared prefs. The file of particular interest is
/data/data/com.symform.android.symform/shared prefs/SymformPrefs
.xml file, which stores the username (email address) and encrypted pass-
word used to login the app. Meanwhile, the folder of interest is the
/data/data/com.symform.android.symform/files/downloads folder,860
which holds a list of files downloaded to the device. No Symform-related
folder or file remained after uninstalling the Android app.
6. Network analysis
When accessing Symform using a web browser, we established the ini-
tial session with the main web server (www.symform.com with IP address865
104.130.154.151 in our research) and then to the login page (control.
symform.com with IP address 173.193.191.132 in our research) over port 80
(HTTP). We observed the network traffic only on port 443 (HTTPS) as soon
as sign-in took place, and Starfield Technologies [73] issued the certificates.
Also occurring was a session with Google Analytic services (e.g., IP addresses870
74.125.*.* in our research) during sign-in. The next servers accessed were
the AmazonAWS servers (e.g., IP addresses 54.231.*.*) which host Amazon
Web Services (EC2) with additional information referencing Symform. An
examination of the client application’s network traffic revealed similar obser-
vations, but we did not observe any session established with the Symform875
web server.
When we downloaded the sample files using a web browser, we located
URLs that made reference to content.symform.com within the TCP stream.
When file synchronisation was undertaken using the client application, we
identified the UDP as the carrying protocol and we could recover the IP880
addresses of the peer nodes. However, the port numbers appeared to be
random, thereby, making the ports unpredictable. Although the files were
encrypted using 256-bit AES encryption, we were able to locate remnants
of the HTTP requests for the backup file fragments including the requests
IDs in the UDP stream (see Figure 28). The corresponding timestamp885
information recorded alongside the relevant IP addresses could be used to
facilitate re-constructing of the user activity timeline.
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Figure 28: An excerpt of UDP stream containing remnants of the HTTP request for a
backup file fragment.
Rebuilding the network captures of Symform web application using Net-
work Miner, we recovered the HTML documents, Javascripts, CSS files, and
image files from the unencrypted traffic. Of all the platforms investigated, we890
were able to recover certificates used to authenticate the HTTPS sessions.
7. Concluding Remarks
The increasing popularity of cloud computing among individual users
and organisations, as well as criminals resulted in the need for forensic
investigators to have a contemporary understanding of the artefacts that895
may be left behind by different types of cloud storage system on a client
device (e.g., personal computers and mobile devices). In this paper, we
described the potential terrestrial artefacts that may be left behind on a client
device running Window 8.1, Ubuntu 14.04 LTS, Mac OS X Mavericks 10.9.5,
iOS 7.1.2 and Android KitKat 4.4 after the use of Symform (a cooperative900
storage cloud service).
Our timestamp analysis indicated that the MD5 and SHA1 hash values
did not change during the process of uploading, storage, and downloading
files from Symform. Examinations of the directory listings revealed that
the Symform client application maintains a list of log files for the main905
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services under %Program Files% \Symform\Node Service\logs\ on Win-
dows 8.1, /var/log/symform/ on Ubuntu, as well as /Library/Application
Support/Symform/bin/ and /private/var/logs/Symform/ on Mac OS.
These logs could be useful in recovering history of Symform usage. This
was not the case for machines and devices running Ubuntu, Mac OS, and910
Android (i.e. we could not recover any system log that could be used to
identify synced files/folders).
The node.config file (located under %Program Files% \Symform\Node
Service\ on Windows 8.1, /var/lib/symform/ on Ubuntu, and
/private/var/lib/ on Mac OS) is another potential evidence source,915
which contains node-specific configuration details for the file synchroni-
sation and contribution services. In all the operating systems investi-
gated, two hidden subfolders namely .symform and .symform-store were
created in the sync/backup folders to store the synced file caches. The
metadata database located within the .symform subfolder would be of920
particular interest to forensic practitioners when seeking to recover the
synced file history of the sync folder. The deleted files could be po-
tentially located in the %$Recycle.Bin% \SID folder on Windows 8.1,
/home/[User Profile]/.local/share/Trash/files folder on Ubuntu, and
/Users/[User profile]/.Trash folder on Mac OS when not emptied. The925
filename and location references, located as part of our research, may facilitate
the identification of other sources of evidence and result in timely preservation
of the evidence.
When we accessed Symform using a web browser, we were
able to locate URLs referencing www.symform.com (Symform930
webpage), control.symform.com (Symform login link), and
content.symform.com/api/v0/folder/[Folder global ID]/[Filename]
(Symform file download link) alongside the associated timestamps and the
view counts in the web browsing information. Meanwhile, accessing the RDM
would leave URLs referencing 127.0.0.1:59234 in the web browsing history.935
The presence of the downloaded files in the web browsing caches would create
potential for alternative methods for recovery of the downloaded files.
Undertaking data carving of the unallocated partitions and memory files
confirmed that we could recover the files of forensic interest from unallocated
partitions and memory files. When we used a browser to access Symform940
web application, the username and password could be potentially recovered
from the RAM. Analysing the system processes using the ‘pslist’ function of
Volatility, we could discern the process names from symformweb, symformsync,
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and symformcontrib on Windows and Ubuntu OS, and Symform on Mac
OS. However, it is noteworthy that we captured the RAM immediately after945
performing each experiment, but prior to a system shutdown in our research.
Thus, the data remnants identified in this research do not represent those
recoverable in a typical “real world” circumstance, unless capturing the RAM
on a suspect system “in real life” immediately after the action but prior to a
shutdown.950
In our investigations on the mobile applica-
tions, we forensically recovered copies of the viewed
files from /private/var/mobile/Applications/[Unique
SHA-1 identifier]/tmp/downloads/ on iOS and
/data/data/com.symform.android.symform/files/downloads/ on955
Android devices. In our examinations of the network captures, we determined
that most of the data from the application layer were encrypted, but the IP
addresses of the peer nodes could be located from the UDP traffic. When
file synchronisation took place using the client application, we were able to
forensically recover the request IDs for the backup file fragments from the960
UDP stream. The corresponding timestamp information recorded alongside
the relevant IP addresses is, particularly, useful for timeline analysis. The
summary of findings from the mobile and computer devices investigated in
this research study is presented in tables 6 and 7.
To keep pace with technological advances, future work would include965
extending this research to other popular cooperative storage cloud services
(e.g., Storj), as well as developing a forensically sound tool to automate
collection of artefacts common to popular cooperative storage cloud services.
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Table 6: Summary (R =Recoverable, P = Possibly Recoverable, N = Not Recoverable).
Platform Source of Evidence Data artefacts found
Installation/
uninstallation information
Username/
Email address
Password
Windows
8.1(client
Directory listings/
Stored files
R R R
and web Registry files R N N
applications) Log files R R N
Web browser files P, client app download link P
R, only saved credentials
in the web browser
Prefetch
R, prefetch files for the executable
files
N N
Thumbcache files R, client app icons N N
Link files R N N
Fileslack N N N
RAM P P
P, only web app login pass-
word
Pagefile.sys P P N
Unallocated space P P N
Ubuntu
14.04 LTS
Directory listings/
Stored files
R R
R, login password from
node.config
Log files R R N
Web browser files
(only RDM)
P, client app download link P N
Thumbcache files N N N
RAM P P P, RDM’s login password
Swap partition P P N
Unallocated partition P P N
Mac OS X
Mavericks
Directory listings/
Stored files
R R
R, login password from
node.config
10.9.5 Log files R R N
Web browser files P, client app download link P N
Thumbcache files N N N
RAM P P P, RDM’s login password
Swap partition P P N
Unallocated partition P P N
iOS 7.1.2 Directory listings/
Stored files
R R N
Log files P N N
Android
Kitkat 4.4
Directory listings/
Stored files
R N
R, login password from
SymformPrefs.xml
Network
traffic
R N N
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Table 7: Summary (R =Recoverable, P = Possibly Recoverable, N = Not Recoverable).
Platform Source of Evidence Data artefacts found
Symform log or configura-
tion files/path references
Symform URLs
Enron sample
files/path references
Windows
8.1(client
Directory listings/
Stored files
R, login password for the client
app from node.config
R R
and web Registry files N R P
applications) Log files
R, copies of node.config file in
symformsync.log
R R
Web browser files N R P
Prefetch N N N
Thumbcache files N N
R, only the synced En-
ron image
Link files N N N
Fileslack N N N
RAM P P P
Pagefile.sys P P P
Unallocated space P P P
Ubuntu
14.04 LTS
Directory listings/
Stored files
R R R
Log files
R, copies of node.config file in
symformsync.log
R R
Web browser files
(only RDM)
N R N
Thumbcache files N N N
RAM P P P
Swap partition P P P
Unallocated partition P P P
Mac OS X
Mavericks
Directory listings/
Stored files
R R R
10.9.5 Log files
R, copies of node.config file in
symformsync.log
R R
Web browser files N R N
Thumbcache files N N N
RAM P P P
Swap partition P P P
Unallocated partition P P P
iOS 7.1.2 Directory listings/
Stored files
R N R
Log files N P, only in the ASL log N
Android
Kitkat 4.4
Directory listings/
Stored files
N N R
Network
traffic
N
R, IP addresses of the
peer nodes
N
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